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This article empirically examines the role of governance in attracting 
FDI for a sample of ten Southern and Eastern Mediterranean 
countries over a 15-year period. We have approximated the 
attractiveness of FDI by governance through an endogenous variable 
called FDI in relation to GDP. The quality of these variables was 
tested by the positioning, dispersion and shape indicators and verified 
the normality of these variables by the Jarque-Berra test and the 
quality of linear adjustment of each variable with respect to its mean. 
The empirical validation of the impact of good governance in the 
attraction of FDI was carried out using the static Panel technique 
and based on the assumption of the absence of a stationarity problem 
for the explanatory variables of our model . Homogeneity-
heterogeneity tests were used to specify the reference model and 
model the role of governance in the attraction of FDI by a panel with 
individual effects. The estimation of this model by the Within and 
GLS procedures yielded significant results. 
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Introduction 
 
There is widespread debate amongst researchers and governments around 
corporate governance. In the United Kingdom and the United States, the focus is 
on weaknesses in the market system in terms of the effectiveness of corporate 
governance. In continental Europe, there is concern that current corporate 
governance systems are hampering innovation and growth. In Eastern Europe, 
privatization leads to questions about how private companies should be governed. 
China is experiencing some forms of corporate governance combining features of 
the market system with a public ownership regime. In spite of all these debates, 
the observations concerning the effects of the different systems of corporate 
governance remain fragmentary. In the area of corporate governance, the facts 
were swept aside by the judgments. 
This article is structured around both parts. In the first part, we will 
synthesize the main empirical work that has addressed the role of governance in 
attracting FDI. In the second part, we will try to verify this role from an 
econometric application on a sample of southern and eastern Mediterranean 
countries. 
 
 
Review of Literature 
 
Several studies have attempted to test the impact of governance mechanisms 
and the choice of financial structure on firm performance (Tong and Tong 2002, 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick 2003 and Cremers and Nair 2005, Allen N. Berger, 
Emilia Bonaccorsi Di Patti 2006 and Lerong He 2008). The review of these 
studies shows a wide variety of variables used to measure the corporate 
governance structure. Some work focuses on the right of shareholders to vote 
(Bethel and Gillian 2002 and Kunz and Angel 1996). Other work is based on the 
firm's ownership structure to test the impact of governance mechanisms on the 
firm's value: Hiraki et al (2003), Sung (2003), Chen (2001) and Kumar (2004) ) 
Respectively in Japan, South Korea, China and India. 
Recently, the idea of building a governance index that synthesizes all control 
mechanisms has prompted empirical research to test the effectiveness of a 
governance structure in aligning the interests of managers Shareholders (for 
example, Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). The work in this framework focuses on 
the governance-performance relationship (Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and 
Gillan, Hartzell and Starks (2003)). Some empirical results show that a better 
governance structure results in better performance (Bebchuck and Cohen 2004, 
Cohen and Ferrel 2004), other research fails to establish a meaningful relationship 
between the governance structure and its performance. Moreover, research that 
attempted to establish a relationship between the governance index and the 
capital structure is very rare (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton 2003, Jiraporn et 
al., 2004 and Litov 2005) . The review of this work shows that some research uses 
the governance index to measure the level of leadership rooted (Litov 2005) and 
the level of protection of shareholders' rights (Jiraporn 2004). Others aim, 
through the construction of a governance index, to test the relevance of the 
hypothesis that the use of debt and the establishment of a good governance 
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structure are two substitutable control mechanisms (Burak et al 2005). Similarly, 
other studies use the governance index as constructed by Gompers et al. (2003) 
to test the impact of quality of governance on the cost of capital (Klock, Mansi, 
and Maxwell 2004). 
The empirical studies of Jiraporn et al. (2014) and Litov (2015) have sought 
to test whether "well-governed" firms that are characterized by low agency costs 
and low levels of asymmetry of information , Make more use of debt to finance 
their investment opportunities. To make themselves the authors call on the index 
of governance conceived by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003). These authors 
classify 24 governance arrangements into five categories: Tactics for Delaying 
Hostile Bidders, Voting, Protection, Takeover and State Laws . The governance 
index is constructed as follows: for each company, the authors sum up "one" for 
each provision that delineates the shareholder's rights (which increases the 
discretion of the manager). Therefore, the level of index G indicates how low the 
shareholder's rights are. A high value of index G implies that it is difficult for 
stakeholders, including external investors, to dismiss a manager or replace the 
board of directors. 
Based on the methodology adopted by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003), 
Jiraporn et al (2014) examined the impact of the governance structure on the 
level of total indebtedness. He argued that the size of agency costs between 
executives and shareholders is likely to be inversely related to the effectiveness of 
control put in place by shareholders. At this level, the capital structure is linked 
to agency costs and agency costs, in turn, are associated with shareholder rights. 
The authors assume that financial choices are influenced by the level of 
protection of shareholder rights within the firm. 
In a first step, Jiraporn et al (2014) proceeded by a single-varied analysis and 
subdivides its sample into two groups according to the level of the governance 
index. Companies whose index value is greater than or equal to 14 are placed in 
the "Dictatorship Portfolio" group, while those with a government index of less 
than or equal to 5 are placed in the "democracy" group (Democracy Portfolio). 
Jiraporn (2014) found that firms of the "dictatorship" type are more indebted 
than those of the "democracy" type. Indeed, the average debt ratio for the 
"dictatorship" group is 49% whereas it is only 44.36% for the group of firms 
qualified as "democracy". These results confirm the suggestion that firms with 
low rights for their shareholders use debt more than firms with good protection of 
their rights. Jiraporn et al (2014) suggested that its findings support the 
predictions of agency theory insofar as debt is used as a disciplinary means within 
firms. In a second step, it adopted a multi-varied regression to test the impact of 
shareholders' rights on the level of indebtedness. To control the possibility of 
nonlinearity of the relation, the author included a quadratic relation. The 
coefficient of the governance index is positive and highly significant, indicating an 
inverse relationship between the use of debt and the strength of shareholder 
rights.  
In the model that includes the possibility of a quadratic relationship between 
the level of debt and shareholder rights, the coefficient of the high squared 
governance index is statistically insignificant, thus rejecting a parabolic 
relationship. Recently, Litov et al (2015) carried out a study similar to that of 
Jiraporn et al (2014), taking into account the American context for the period 
1990 to 2013. They used the index retained by Gompers et al (2003) to measure 
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the level of leadership rooted . The higher the value of the G index means the 
higher the level of rooting of the leader. 
Jiraporn et al (2014) classified the total sample into five quartiles according 
to the level of leadership rooted . Results show that the ratio of debt to book 
value and market value increases with the level of rooting (the debt ratio rises 
from 0.485 when G is less than 6 to wait 0.571 when G is greater than 13). These 
results contradict the suggestion that ingrained leaders prefer a low level of 
indebtedness. The theoretical explanation of the positive relationship between the 
level of rooting and the debt decision is based on the endogenous choice of the 
level of risk taken by managers in an investment policy, depending on the 
effectiveness of The governance structure in place. In a well-governed 
environment (WellMonitored), supervised executives agree to undertake risky 
projects because it is easy to determine the quality of managers (poor quality vs. 
good quality). Indeed, the effectiveness of governance mechanisms tends to reduce 
the risk aversion of the manager justified mainly by their human capital and 
provided incentives to increase target debt levels (Target Ratio).  
To test the explanatory power of the governance structure on the change in 
the debt ratio, Jiraporn et al (2014) adopted a model similar to that established 
by Frank and Goyal (2003), which aims to test the relevance of the theory 
Hierarchy of funding . The latter is tested according to the chosen quartiles, 
which break down the firms according to the degree of rooting of their managers. 
The author's findings suggest that the Pecking Order theory works better in 
firms characterized by a high level of roots on the part of their leaders. Indeed, 
the order of financing followed by these firms is as follows: self-financing, debt 
and equity as a last resort. Concerning the dynamic relationship between the root 
level and the debt, the study by Litov et al (2015) showed that an increase in the 
root index G (such as the insertion of a new disposition Anti-takeover bid) is 
associated with an average increase of 3.16% in the debt-to-value ratio and 2.25% 
in the debt-to-market ratio. At the conclusion of his study, Litov et al (2015, p. 
12) emphasized an important empirical relationship, namely the causality 
between the governance structure and debt: 
The work of Kale et al (2015) aimed to test the relationship between 
governance structure and debt as two substitutable control mechanisms for a 
sample of 2408 US firms. To test the duality of this relation, the authors retained 
two simultaneous equations. According to the first, these authors sought to 
examine the relevance of the governance structure as a deterministic factor in the 
level of indebtedness. The results show that the governance index negatively 
affects debt (the coefficients vary between -0.0523 and -0.4854 and are significant 
at the 1% threshold). Through the second equation, these authors tend to 
examine the deterministic role of debt for the establishment of a governance 
structure.  
The results show that indebtedness negatively affects the governance index 
(coefficients vary between - 0.0740 and - 0.2013). These results suggest, therefore, 
that debt and the governance structure are two substitutable control 
mechanisms. By adopting a dynamic vision, Kale et al (2015) argued that 
managers reduce their debt levels when faced with an exogenous increase in 
governance mechanisms . To test this suggestion empirically, the authors carried 
out a comparative study of the debt levels before and after the imposition of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and the rigorous governance mechanisms 
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implemented by NASDAQ and NYSE in 2003. The results show that the total 
debt ratios measured at market value and at book value decline between the 
periods 1999,2000 and 2001 and 2003. For example, the average debt-to-equity 
ratio increased from 0,228 in 1999 To 0.195 in 2003, ie an approximate decrease 
of 14.5%. Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003) estimated the relationship 
between corporate governance and debt level for a sample of 447 Asian, European 
and Latin American firms. For Asian firms, they found that low corporate 
governance is associated with high levels of debt. Despite this constructive 
research, attention to exploring organizational finance to enrich the explanation 
of the determinants of firms' financing choices remains limited. 
In particular, the vein of work on the determinants of the capital structure, 
although fruitful, neglects the explanatory power of the ownership structure. 
Pablo de Andrés et al (2006) in this context, their paper have developed 
responses to the relationship between bank performance and effective supervision 
of bank agency managers. They considered the question of whether banks with 
less efficient boards show results that are different from those banks that can 
direct and advise their managers more effectively, because such differences could 
be due to weaknesses in different control mechanisms. 
 
 
Empirical validation and results 
 
In this article, we will analyze the effect of good governance in attracting 
foreign direct investment (FDI), ie we demonstrate the contribution of good 
governance in the creation of a Favorable climate for FDI. To do so, we will 
verify this contribution from a sample of the ten SEMC countries during a study 
period from 2000 to 2014. Our sample contains the following countries: Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel , Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. 
We will use several endogenous and explanatory variables in order to 
understand the importance of governance on the increase of direct investment 
abroad. To do this, we approximate the movement of attraction of FDI by 
governance by the variable explained FDI-GDP. This variable is expressed as the 
flow of FDI relative to gross domestic product (GDP).  
These FDIs represent the net inflows of investments to acquire a sustainable 
investment in an enterprise operating in an economy other than investment. This 
variable corresponds to the sum of own funds, reinvestment of profits, other long-
term capital and short-term capital. This variable expresses the net inflows of 
new investment flows into the reporting economy by foreign investors and is 
divided by GDP. Our endogenous variable is released from the World Bank. The 
explanatory variables for the attractiveness of FDI are subdivided into variables 
of governance and macroeconomic variables. 
The governance variables are: Infrastructure, Citizen Voice and 
Responsibility, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government 
Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Regulatory Quality and Fighting Corruption. The 
macroeconomic variable represents the per capita gross domestic product in 
constant dollars for the 2010 base year, which measures purchasing power parity 
and human capital. 
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The infrastructure (Infr) is approximated by the number of telephone lines 
per 100 inhabitants, it is a variable that represents the infrastructure in the host 
country. We obtained this variable from the World Bank  and this corresponds to 
the industrial factor which has a crucial influence in the increase of FDI in a 
country. 
Voice of citizenship and responsibility (VOA) is expressed by the perception 
of the capacity of citizens of a country to participate in the selection of their 
leaders, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association and free media. 
This VOA has an institutional power and in this work we are based on the works 
of Kaufman et al. (1999) and Transparency International, to obtain the data base 
for the period 2000-2014. 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence (SPAV) is the probability that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent 
means. This stability is an institutional variable and is obtained from the work of 
Kaufman et al. (1999). 
Public Service Effectiveness (PPE) is measured the quality of public services, 
the quality of the public service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and the implementation and 
credibility of the public service. Government's commitment to these policies. This 
CPE is an institutional variable emerging from the work of Kaufman et al. 
(1999). 
The perception of the extent to which agents trust and respect the rules of 
the company and in particular the quality of the performance of contracts, 
property rights, the police and the courts as well as The likelihood of crime and 
violence. This ED is estimated from Kaufman et al. (1999) and represents an 
institutional factor. 
Regulatory Quality (RQ) is the government's ability to formulate and enforce 
policies and regulations that allow and promote private sector development. This 
quality is obtained from Kaufman et al. (1999). Fight against corruption is 
approximated by the capacity of the government to formulate and implement 
policies and regulations that enable and promote the development of the private 
sector. 
Human capital (HC) is measured by the enrollment rate in secondary 
education. This capital is the commercial factor of attractiveness of FDI. Our 
database contains two dimensions: a temporal dimension spanning 15 years and 
an individual dimension of the ten SEMC countries. For this purpose, we will use 
advanced econometric techniques to estimate these individual-temporal data. 
We will use position, dispersion and form indicators to analyze our data base 
for our sample of SEMC countries which includes: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey during a study period from 
2000 to 2014. Our database contains nine variables: FDI-GDP, VOA, STAB, 
GOV, QUAL, STATE, CORR, INF, CH, GDP. From the position indicators (see 
table 1 in Appendices), we can see that the averages are negative for the 
explanatory variables of political stability, citizen voice, governance, quality of 
regulation, state and law and corruption. On the other hand, these averages are 
positive for the endogenous variable (FDI-GDP) and gross domestic product, 
infrastructure and human capital.  
The median divides the population of each variable into two equal parts. 
Also, we note that the number of observations equal to 150 and the cross-section 
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is equal to 10. We will study the estimation quality and the adjustment of each 
component of our database based on absolute and relative dispersion indicators. 
For this purpose, Table 2 (see Appendices) corresponds to the dispersion criteria 
for these variables. We find from the dispersion indicators that the standard 
deviations are very low for variables VOA, Stability, Governance, Quality and 
regulation, State and law and corruption. Hence, this is a good fit for these 
variables.  
On the other hand, the standard deviations are high for the endogenous 
variable and the rest of the explanatory variables and the linear adjustment of 
these variables is very poor. The precision indicator is bad for the endogenous 
variable because the variance of this variable is very high. 
On the other hand, the risks for the variables where the very low standard 
deviations are very minimal. We will study the normality of these explanatory 
variables and the contribution of FDI to economic growth for the ten SEMC 
(Southern and Eastern Mediterranean) countries.  countries through the Jarque-
Berra statistics. Table 3 (see Appendices) summarizes the shape indicators for 
these variables.  
Referring to this table we can see that the variables VOA, Qual, State and 
CH follow normal laws since Jarque-Bera statistics are less than the tabulated 
value of Chi-two at two degrees of freedom. On the other hand, the endogenous 
variable, ie the contribution of FDI to economic growth for the sample of SEMC 
countries during our study period, does not follow the normal law because the 
Jarque-Bera statistic is significant At the 1% risk threshold.  
The nonlinearity of this variable is explained by the asymmetry of the 
information for the FDI relative to the gross domestic product and the non-
flattening. Also, the fight against corruption, infrastructure, GDP and governance 
do not follow the normal law because their Jarque-Bera statistics are higher than 
the critical value of the Chi-two law with two degrees of freedom. Despite this, 
the governance variable follows the normal law only within a risk threshold of 5% 
and 1%. We will try to estimate a static relationship that describes the 
contribution of direct investment abroad to GDP in terms of the various 
explanatory variables: Infrastructure (Inf), Voice of Citizenship and 
Responsibility (VOA), Political Stability and Absence (QUAL), Rule of law 
(State), Quality of regulation (Gov) and Fight against corruption (CORR). The 
macroeconomic variable represents the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) 
in constant dollars for the 2010 base year that measures purchasing power parity. 
We will estimate our reference model during a study period from 2000 to 
2014 for a sample of ten countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. Our basic model can be written in the 
following form: 
 
ititiit
itiitiitiitiitiitiiiit
LCHLGDP
FDIGDP
ετη
ϕλγφδχβα
+++
+++++++=
i
it
      
INFCORRSTATEQUALGOVSTABVOA
 
 
The innovations itε   are assumed to be iid of zero mean and of variance 
equal to [ ]N1,i ,2 ∈εσ   
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Table 4 (see Appendices) will present the homogeneity tests for our basic 
model. We note that all the coefficients are ideal for the ten SEMC countries, 
although the constants are different for these countries.  
For this purpose, we specify the contribution of FDI to GDP by a panel with 
individual effects. We will use the Within and GLS techniques to estimate this 
contribution. Table 5 (see Appendices) summarizes these two estimation 
procedures in the observation of static relations. They describe the linear 
equation that links FDI to GDP in terms of the explanatory variables of 
governance and macroeconomics. 
The estimation of the static relationship that describes the contribution of 
FDI to GDP for the sample of SEMC countries yields expected and significant 
results. But, corruption has a positive and insignificant impact on the Within or 
LSDV method. On the other hand, this corruption has a negative and significant 
effect by the GLS method. The law and the state play a positive and not 
significant role in the increase of the FDI volumes for the Within technique but 
significant by the GLS procedure. Gross domestic product has a positive and 
significant influence on the two appropriate technologies. Political stability has a 
negative and insignificant effect on FDI volumes. We will use the Hausman 
arbitration test (1978) to identify the nature of the individual effects. Table 6 
(see Appendices) corresponds to the Hausman test (1978)  for the contribution of 
FDI to GDP for the SEMC area during a study period from 2000 to 2014.  
Hausman's (1978) statistic is greater than the tabulated chi-square value at 
nine degrees of freedom. Hence, the individual effects are fixed and we choose the 
In technique to estimate the static relationship that links the contribution of FDI 
to GDP as a function of the explanatory variables. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we examined the role of governance in attracting FDI. For this, 
we have empirically analyzed this effect from a sample of the ten countries over a 
period of 15 years. We approximated the movement of FDI attractions by 
governance by an endogenous variable called FDI versus GDP. This variable 
corresponds to the contribution of FDI to economic growth. Our database is 
extracted from the World Bank for nine variables: IDE-GDP, VOA, STAB, 
GOV, QUAL, STATE, CORR, INF, CH, GDP.  
These variables group into three groups: An endogenous FDI-GDP variable, 
governance variables that are; (VOL), Political Stability and Absence of Violence 
(STAB), Government Effectiveness (GOV), Rule of Law (STATUS), Quality of 
Regulation and Fighting Corruption (CORR) ) And the macroeconomic variables 
that are; Gross domestic product (GDP) and human capital (HC). We have 
studied the quality of these variables by the position, dispersion and shape 
indicators. We verified the normality of these variables by the Jarque-Berra test 
and we detected the quality of linear adjustment of each variable with respect to 
its mean.  
The empirical validation of the impact of good governance on the attraction 
of FDI and economic growth is validated from a sample of the 10 countries over 
15 years. For this we used the Static Panel technique and based on the 
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assumption of the absence of a stationarity problem for the explanatory variables 
of our basic model. 
We have referred to the homogeneity-heterogeneity tests to specify this 
reference model and we model the role of governance in the attraction of FDI by 
a panel with individual effects. We have estimated this model by the Within and 
GLS procedures. These estimation procedures yield expected and significant 
results. We have arbitrated between these two procedures estimates by the 
Hausman test (1978). We have identified the nature of individual effects by fixed 
special characters that are invariant over time. 
 
 
References 
 
Berger, S.E and Banaccorsi, di P. (2006). Capital Structure and firm performance: A new approach to 
testing agency theory and an application to the bank industry, Journal of Banking and Finance, 
no 30, pp. 1065-1102. 
Burak and al. (2005, p.9). The Impact of Industry 4.0 on the Supply Chain, Innovations and 
Strategies for Logistics and Supply Chains Technologies, Business Models and Risk Management, 
Proceedings of the Hamburg International Conference of Logistics.  
Bebchuk, L.A and Cohen A. (2004). The costs of entrenched boards, Working paper, John M. Olin 
Center for Law, Economics and Business, Harvard Law School. 
Bebchuk L.C and Ferrell A. (2004). What matters in corporate governance?, Working Paper, de 
Harvard Law School. 
Bethel, J.E and Gillian, S.L. (2002). The Impact of the Institutional and Regulatory Environment on 
Shareholder Voting, Financial Management, Vol. 31, pp. 29-54. 
Cremers, K J M and Nair V B. (2005). Governance mechanisms and Equity Prices, Journal of 
Finance, no 60, pp. 2859-2894. 
Chen J.C. (2001). Ownership structure as corporate governance mechanism: evidence from Chinese 
listed companies, Economics of Planning, Vol. 34, pp. 53-72 
Frank M.Z and Goyal V.K. (2003). Testing the Pecking Order Theory of Capital Structure, Journal of 
Financial Economics, No 67, pp. 217-248. 
Friedman, E, Simon J and Todd M. (2003). Propping And Tunneling, Journal of Comparative 
Economics,  Vol. 31, pp. 732-750 
Georgia K.J., Ryan Jr, H.E and Wang L. (2015). Debt as a bonding mechanism: Evidence from the 
relations between employee productivity, capital structure, and outside employment 
opportunities, Working Paper, Georgia State University. 
Gompers, P.A, Ishii, J.L and Metrick, A. (2003). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, no  1, pp. 107-155.  
Hermalin B.E and Michael S.W. (2003). Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined 
Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic 
Policy Review, no 9(1), pp. 7-26. 
Hiraki T, Inoue H, Ito A, Kuroki F and Masuda H. (2003). Corporate governance and firm value in 
Japan: Evidence from 1985 to 1998, Pacific-Basin Finance J, Vol. 11, pp.239-265. 
Lerong He. (2008). Do founders matter ? A study of executive compensation, governance structure 
and firm performance, Journal of Business Venturing, no  23 (3), pp. 257-279. 
Jiraporn, P., Jiraporn N Boeprasert A and Chang, K. (2014). Does corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) improve credit ratings? Evidence from geographic identification, Financial Management, 
No 43(3), pp. 505-531. 
Jiraporn P and Dalt P.J. (2004). Causes and consequences of audit shopping: an analysis of auditor 
opinions, Earnings management and auditor changes, WN Davidson. 
Kumar J. (2004). Share holding Pattern and Firm Performance Finance,  No 0409008, Econ WPA. 
Kaufmann, Daniel A.K and Pablo Z.L. (1999). Aggregating Governance Indicators, World Bank 
Policy Research, Working Paper, No. 2195, Washington D.C  
Kunz R.M and Angel J.J. (1996). Factors affecting the value of the stock voting right: Evidence from 
the Swiss equity market, Financial Management, pp. 7-20 
Litov L.P. (2005). Corporate governance and financing policy: new evidence, working paper 
Open  Science  Journal  
Research Article 	  
Open  Science  Journal  -­‐August  2017     	   10  
Mark K., Sattar A.M and William F.M. (2005). Does Corporate Governance Matter to Bondholders?, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 40, issue 04, pp. 693-719. 
Phillip T.L., Litov L.P and Landon M.M. (2015). Lead Independent Directors: Good Governance or 
Window Dressing?, Scholarly Papers, Arizona State University, University of Oklahoma - Michael 
F. Price College of Business and Florida State University, Department of Accounting. 
Prommin P., Jumreornvong S and Jiraporn P. (2014). The effect of corporate governance on stock 
liquidity: The case of Thailand, International Review of Economics and Finance, Vol. 32, No 7, 
pp. 132-142. 
Pablo de A.A and Eleuterio V.G. (2006). Corporate governance in banking: The role of Board of 
Directors, Document de Treball núm, Vol. 06/4 
Sung W.J. (2003). Corporate governance and firm profitability: evidence from Korea before the 
economic crisis, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 68, issue 2, pp. 287-322 
Stuart L.G and Laura T.S. (2003). Corporate Governance, Corporate Ownership, and the Role of 
Institutional Investors: A Global Perspective, Journal of Applied Finance, Vol. no 13, pp. 4-22. 
Sun, Q, Tong, W and Tong, J. (2002). How does government ownership affect firm performance? 
Evidence from China’s privatization experience, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, no  
29, pp.1-27. 
The Macro Data Guide, Transparency International Social Sciences Conference in Kolkata-India. 18-
20 December 2015. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Open  Science  Journal  
Research Article 	  
Open  Science  Journal  -­‐August  2017     	   11  
Appendices 
 
Table 1: Indicators of positions 
 
Average Médian Maximum Minimum 
FDI-
GDP 3.726222 2.003372 23.53736 -0.469310 
VOA -0.744149 -0.768232 0.769107 -1.960072 
STAB -0.634380 -0.552506 0.788418 -2.171064 
GOV -0.147069 -0.146406 1.345444 -1.212487 
QUAL -0.254975 -0.172288 1.215053 -1.947827 
STATE -0.116055 -0.106493 1.258530 -1.156871 
CORR -0.252480 -0.320450 1.471174 -1.257209 
INF 26.69394 27.26709 29.28889 22.26934 
CH 73.19633 72.25140 111.1814 36.42012 
GDP 4740.741 2247.805 22239.05 1203.193 
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Table 2 : Dispersion Indicators  
 
Standard 
deviation 
Variance 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Mean Error 
 
FDI 4.374718 19.13815 1.174036 0.3571942 
VOA 0.6830973 0.466622 -0.917958 0.0557747 
STAB 0.6328679 0.4005218 -0.9976171 0.0516735 
GOV 0.6407208 0.4105231 -4.356602 0.0523146 
QUAL 0.7250448 0.52569 -2.843587 0.0591997 
STATE 0.5490512 0.3014572 -4.730944 0.0448298 
CORR 0.5931841 0.3518674 -2.349429 0.0484333 
INF 11.86534 140.7864 0.7317869 0.9688012 
CH 17.98704 323.5337 0.2296295 1.473556 
GDP 5391.987 2.91 710×  1.137372 440.2539 
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Table 3 : Form indicators  
 
 Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera Significance 
FDI-
GDP  1.799363  6.002603  137.2904  0.000000 
VOA  0.388352  2.708219  4.302526  0.116337 
STAB -0.291610  2.524487  3.539106  0.170409 
GOV  0.440394  2.735241  5.286786  0.071120 
QUAL -0.182855  2.827634  1.021586  0.600019 
STATE  0.267919  2.848080  1.938767  0.379317 
CORR  0.900939  3.506524  21.89580  0.000018 
INF -0.656917  2.068415  16.21255  0.000302 
CH  0.145529  2.324609  3.380421  0.184481 
GDP  2.179587  6.616568  200.5122  0.000000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: The homogénéity tests 
 
Homogénéity of 
constants Homogénéity of coefficients 
FDI-GDP it 21.51 (0,000) 0.95 (0.9754) 
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Table 5: Estimation of FDI-GDP  for the SEMC Zone  
Variables Estimate Within Estimate GLS 
VOA 
 
-1.493164 (0.477) -3.74525(0.059) 
STAB 
 
-1.560287(0.157) -0.9475856(0.394) 
GOV 
 
-5.092323(0.013) 
-5.225598(0.014) 
QUAL 
 
5.074164(0.063) 9.126661(0.000) 
STATE 
 
3.259807(0.194) 2.543866(0.348) 
CORR 
 
0.7269082(0.716) -1.772768 (0.387) 
INF 
 
-0.2391452(0.004) -0.2211231(0.012) 
LCH 
 
3.971918(0.096) 3.084236(0.207) 
LPIB 
 
1.612062(0.233) 2.82394(0.049 ) 
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Table 6 : Hausman test 
 FDI-GDP it 
Stat-Hausman ( )9
2χ =  261.04(0.000) 
